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and less time to taking care of their younger siblings. Overall, total household hours
to child care increase. These ndings indicate that Progresa not only fosters human
capital accumulation through keeping teenage girls in school but also through more
and arguably better (mother provided) child care.
Keywords: Child Care Provision, Substitution E¤ects, Semiparametric Esti-
mation, Conditional Cash Transfer Programs.
JEL Codes: D10, J13, J22, I00.
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ, INRA, IDEI): pierre.dubois@tse-fr.eu. 21 allée de Brienne,
F-31000 Toulouse.
yInstitute for Fiscal Studies: marta_r@ifs.org.uk. IFS, 7 Ridgmount Street, London, WC1E 7AE.
zWe would like to thank Márton Csillag, Paul Gertler, Sylvie Lambert, Arthur Lewbel, Thierry
Magnac, Elena Stancanelli, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at IPEA, and participants
at the NEUDC, ESEM, LAMES, RES and IATUR meetings for useful comments and suggestions on
earlier versions of this paper. All errors are our own.
1
1 Introduction
In recent years, the economic case for public investment in Early Childhood Development
(ECD) has become increasingly forceful. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue that invest-
ments in the early years have higher returns than investments later on in life because of
the existence of dynamic complementarities in the learning process: early learning fosters
and facilitates later learning. Moreover, remediating early disadvantages later may be
prohibitively costly (Cunha and Heckman 2007). In both developed and developing coun-
tries, low ECD outcomes often linked to poor family environments are associated with
inadequate school readiness and lower school performance (Currie 2001; Maluccio et al.
2009; Walker et al. 2005); lower earning capacity (Currie and Thomas 2001; Hoddinott
et al. 2008); higher criminality (Carneiro and Heckman 2003; Garces et al. 2002); and
lower levels of social integration (Walker et al. 2006). Children growing up with nutri-
tional and psychosocial decits are also less likely to provide adequate care and resources
for their own children, thus contributing to economic inequality (Behrman et al. 2009;
Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007; Heckman and Masterov 2007).
The relevance of stimulation and the home environment on ECD is well established
empirically (see Walker et al 2007 for a review). However, caregivers may fail to provide
adequate care and stimulation if they lack su¢ cient time, energy, knowledge and money.
Because these resources are often scarce in impoverished rural environments, there is
scope for Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs such as the Progresa program in
Mexico to improve the circumstances in which children from beneciary families begin
their lives. Even if CCT programs are not specically designed as ECD interventions
per se, the monetary incentives they provide are likely to a¤ect child rearing practices
within a household through changes in the intra-household allocation of time to various
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activities generated by income and substitution e¤ects. Moreover, the additional benets
they provide in the form of nutritional supplements, health monitoring, and educational
talks covering best health, hygiene and nutrition practices (the so-called "pláticas") can
also a¤ect child care provision through raising awareness and increasing knowledge.
In this paper, we investigate whether Progresa a¤ects child care provision through one
specic pathway namely, a re-allocation of time given over to child care amongst house-
hold members. We exploit time use data on the randomized Progresa evaluation sample to
semiparametrically identify the impact of the program on participation and on the extent
of participation in child care activities for mothers and sisters (ages 12 to 17) of under
3 year old children. We focus the analysis on mothers and their older daughters as they
are the two main child care providers in the household. Moreover, since transfers increase
with grade and are larger for girls than boys at secondary school, daughters of secondary
school age make the family eligible for receiving the largest transfers, conditional on their
school attendance. This strengthens the case for larger economic incentives to enhance
substitution e¤ects in the allocation of time devoted to child care between mothers and
their older daughters. Estimates support the existence of such substitution e¤ect. We nd
a 14% increase in mother provided child care in treatment households with teenagers 12
to 17 and children less than 3 years old. In turn, these older daughters reduce their child
care participation by 36% and increase their school participation by 10%. Overall, total
household time to child care increases, which implies net increases in child care quantity.
The contribution of this study is twofold. Methodologically, we exploit the experi-
mental nature of the Progresa evaluation data to obtain a semiparametric estimate of
treatment on time allocation. We apply the Lewbel (2000) estimator for qualitative re-
sponse models to binary and ordered data, and argue that it o¤ers a consistent estimate of
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the program impacts on intra-household time allocation decisions. Cogneau and Maurin
(2001) and Goux and Maurin (2005) are, to the best of our knowledge, the only existing
empirical applications of this method to date. In our case, in addition to the interest
in avoiding parametric assumptions, the use of this method is motivated by the seek
for robustness in the estimation of limited dependent variables and by the presence of
non-classical measurement errors.
In terms of ndings, the analysis provides evidence that Progresa increases human
capital accumulation both by keeping teenage girls in school and through more and "bet-
ter" (mother provided) child care, according to the literature on biology, psychology and
economics of education. For example, Case and Paxson (2001) and Case et al. (2001)
provide empirical evidence of the important role the biological mother as opposed to
the stepmother plays in the adequate investment in childrens health and education. In
the case of Progresa, beneciary mothers may also increase their knowledge on parenting
through the interaction with medical sta¤ at the health centers and by attending the ed-
ucational talks. Hence, linking benets to school attendance can simultaneously improve
the quantity and quality of child care provided in the household.
The interest of economists in child care arrangements initially revolved around the
responsiveness of female labor supply and child care demand to job related child care
subsidizing policies (Heckman 1974; Michalopoulos et al. 1992; Averett et al. 1997).
Since Blau and Robins (1988), a number of studies have addressed family labor sup-
ply, fertility and child care provision decisions within an intra-household time allocation
framework (Mueller 1984; Tiefenthaler 1997). Following the expansion of CCT interven-
tions worldwide, an increasingly extensive literature has developed around the impacts of
these programs on child health and nutrition see Lagarde et al. (2007) for a review and
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more recently, on ECD (Gertler and Fernald 2004; Fernald et al. 2008; Paxson and Schady
2010; Macours et al. 2008). This paper contributes to both literatures by shedding some
light on one of the mechanisms namely, changes in household time allocation through
which CCT programs can a¤ect child care provision and in turn, ECD.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
Progresa program, the experimental design and the data. In Section 3, we discuss the
potential mechanisms through which the program can a¤ect time allocated to child care.
In Section 4, we present the Lewbel (2000) semiparametric estimator and discuss identi-
cation. Results are in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Rural Progresa Program and the Experiment
2.1 The Progresa Program
The Mexican government established the Progresa CCT program in 1997 in order to
break the inter-generational transmission of poverty by alleviating current poverty while
investing in the human capital of the next generation.1 The program provides nancial
incentives (cash) to parents to invest in the health, nutrition and education of their chil-
dren. Progresa is one of the largest CCT interventions in the world, with approximately
4.5 billion US dollars distributed to some 5.8 million beneciary households in 2010.2
When Progresa began rolling out in 1997, program eligibility was determined in two
stages (Skouas et al. 2001). First, underserved communities were identied based on the
1Progresa was renamed Oportunidades during the Fox administration in 2000. Because the data used
here are from the rural Progresa evaluation (1997 to 2000), we refer to the program under its original
name throughout the text.
2http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/Portal/wb/Web/poblacion_objetivo_y_montos_asignados
_para_el_ejer
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proportion of households living in very poor conditions as dened using data from the 1995
census (Conteo de Población y Vivienda). Second, low-income households within those
communities were chosen by means of a proxy means test constructed using basic socio-
economic data collected in the Encuesta de Características Socioeconómicas de los Hogares
(ENCASEH). This process designated 52% of the households in selected communities as
eligible for benets.3 All eligible households living in treatment communities were o¤ered
Progresa and over 90% enrolled. Once enrolled, households received benets for a three-
year period conditional on meeting the program requirements with the possibility of being
recertied.
Cash transfers from Progresa are given to the female head of the household and are
conditional on children attending school, family members obtaining preventive medical
care, and female heads attending the pláticas.4 They come bimonthly in two forms.
The rst, received by all beneciary households, is a x cash stipend of 90 pesos per
month (in 1997 prices) intended for families to spend on more and better nutrition. It
is complemented with nutritional supplements and immunization directed to 0 to 2 year
olds, and to pregnant and lactating women. The second is an educational grant given
to each child younger than 18 and enrolled in school between the third grade of primary
school and the third grade (last) of secondary school conditional on attending school
a minimum of 85% of the time and on not repeating a grade more than twice. The
3Subsequently, the Government decided that a subset of households had been unduly excluded and
expanded the eligibility criteria to include a set of slightly wealthier households in a process called
"densication" (Hoddinott and Skouas 2004).
4This represented an innovation in the Mexican social protection system, which used to give transfers
to the head of household (typically a male) up until Progresa. However, if a female head of household
was not present or able to receive payments, an alternate household member was designated for receipt
of payment. Compliance with conditions was veried through the clinics and schools. About 1% of
households were denied the cash transfer for noncompliance.
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educational scholarship varies by grade and gender. It rises substantially after graduation
from primary school and is higher for girls than boys during secondary school. The
rates vary from 60 pesos per month for children enrolled in third grade of primary to
225 pesos per month for females enrolled in the third year of secondary school. Hence,
households with more female children enrolled in higher grades are eligible for larger
transfers compared to similar households with male children enrolled, or children enrolled
in lower grades. Beneciary children also receive money for school supplies once a year
during secondary school, and twice a year during primary school.
In order to prevent individual migration into the household, only children who were
living in the household at the time of incorporation are eligible for the school transfers.
Children born into the household will be eligible for future educational transfers once they
reach 9 years old and enter the third grade of primary school. Finally, total transfers for
any given household are capped at a pre-determined upper limit of 550 pesos per month.
The cap implies that a household cannot receive an unlimited amount by increasing
the number of children enrolled in school. It also implicitly implies that enrolling more
than three older children (per household) in school will not increase the total amount of
transfers received by the household. There appears to have been no e¤ect of the program
on fertility rates or family structure (Stecklov et al. 2007).
On average, cash transfers from Progresa represent over 20% of total household income.
Skouas (2005) discusses the program at length and provides a review of its impacts.
2.2 Experimental Design and Data
The Mexican Government committed to a rigorous evaluation of the program using a
controlled-randomized design. Given budgetary and logistical constraints, the Govern-
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ment could not enroll all eligible families in the country simultaneously and had to phase
in the enrollment of entire communities over time instead. As part of the programs na-
tional scale up, the Government randomly assigned communities in the rst seven states
to be phased in, to treatment (320 communities) and control (186 communities) groups.
Eligible households in treatment communities began receiving benets in March/April
of 1998, while eligible households in control communities were incorporated in Novem-
ber/December of 1999. In order to minimize anticipation e¤ects, households in control
communities were not informed that Progresa would provide benets to them until two
months before incorporation. Behrman and Todd (1999) conrm that the original ran-
domization balanced the control and treatment communities, and Attanasio et al. (2011)
explicitly test but nd no evidence of anticipation e¤ects amongst control households.
The data used in this paper comes from the Progresa rural evaluation surveys, the
Encuestas de Evaluación de los Hogares Rurales (ENCEL), and the ENCASEH baseline
data. The ENCEL interviewed all households in the 506 evaluation communities every
six months between 1998 and 2000, and again in November 2003. The May 1999 survey
collected additional data on time use for all household members older than eight.5 By then,
treatment households had enjoyed benets for over a year, while no control household had
yet received transfers. This allows us to obtain an estimate of the average treatment e¤ect
on time devoted to child care.
We construct a dataset of mothers older than 18 years of age living in eligible house-
holds in May 1999. We then match each mother to the characteristics and time allocation
of her older daughter younger than 18 and still living in the household. We use time
5Parker and Skouas (2000) and Rubio-Codina (2010) provide further details on these data. Rubio-
Codina (2010) estimates the impacts of the program on intra-household time allocation but does not
specically focus on time to child care.
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use data to construct our main dependent variables. Specically, the question on time
devoted to child care reads: "how many minutes did household member i devote yester-
day to the care of small children, the elderly or the sick?". To narrow the scope of the
question to the care of young children, we restrict the sample of analysis to mothers of
children younger than 3 living in households where there are no elderly or sick members
that might require care. Given the data available, this implies excluding households with:
(i) elders older than 65 that did not engage in any paid or unpaid work activity during
the week before the interview; and (ii) members older than 6 that reported being unable
to perform regular activities during the month prior to the interview.6
The nal sample consists of 4,036 mothers (2,571 treatment and 1,465 control) with
children younger than 3. This represents 34% of all eligible households originally classi-
ed as poor.7 Approximately 37% of these women are also mothers of a teenager 976 in
treatment households and 536 in control households and 24% 636 treatments and 343
controls have a 12 to 17 year old daughter. Note that the proportion of mothers with dif-
ferent o¤spring compositions is balanced in treatment and control households and remains
similar to the randomized distribution: 60% treatment and 40% control. This suggests
that the potential for sample selection and sample composition biases is negligible.
6Although the program has improved self-reported health status for children and adults (Gertler and
Boyce 2001) as well as childrens nutritional status (Rivera et al. 2004; Behrman and Hoddinott 2005), we
argue that dropping these households does not bias our estimates because: (i) they only represent 7% and
2% of the households in the estimation sample, respectively; (ii) these proportions are balanced between
treatment and control groups; and (iii) parametric estimates are robust to keeping these households in.
7We do not use "densied" households i.e. the set of wealthier and older households that were
deemed eligible later because their process of incorporation in the program is less well documented and
many su¤ered substantial administrative delays in the receipt of benets (Hoddinott and Skouas 2004).
Because households were categorized as "densied" in both treatment and control communities and under
the same criteria, excluding them does not compromise the internal consistency of our estimates.
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In Table I we provide further evidence that our sample of analysis is balanced by
comparing the means of a set of maternal characteristics in May 1999 (Panel I), and
baseline household and community characteristics (Panels II and III) between treatments
and controls. The test of equality of means (reported in the last column) shows no
statistically signicant di¤erences in any of the variables reported, which include o¤spring
composition and baseline household demographics. The only exception is the number of
sons ages 12 to 17, which is signicantly larger for treatment mothers.
Table I also presents descriptive statistics on the analysis sample. On average, mothers
of children younger than 3 are around 30 years old and have 3.5 years of education. Less
than 2% are the head of the household, 41% report speaking an indigenous language,
and between 6% (control) and 9% (treatment) work for a wage. On average, they have
between 1 and 2 children younger than 3, 1 child ages 4 to 7, and 1 child 8 to 17.
3 Progresa and Child Care Provision
According to traditional household models, family utility is maximized when household
members allocate their time to the production of those commodities in which they have a
comparative advantage (Becker 1973). Womens believed comparative advantage in home
time would thus explain part of the gender gap in market work participation and female
specialization in household activities, including the care of children. Such traditional
division of labor between genders is still well established in rural Mexico (INEGI 2002;
Parker and Skouas 2000). In the Progresa evaluation sample, 60.2% of prime age (18
to 54) men report working for a wage, as opposed to only 4.8% of prime age women.
On the other hand, the proportion of prime age males engaged in domestic chores is
signicantly lower than that of prime age women. For example, only 2.3% of men versus
10
84.8% of women report having spent some time cleaning the house during the day before
the interview. Similarly, 1.2% of men report having done some cooking in contrast to
88.6% of women.
Child care is also a predominantly female activity. As an illustration, Figure A plots
participation rates in child care by age and sex amongst individuals in the Progresa
evaluation sample. As shown, while participation rates oscillate between 40 and 60% for
prime age women, men participation rates are around 8%. A peak is observed for both
men and women in their early twenties. Note also that female participation in child care
increases sharply from the age of 12. Indeed, while 7.5% of girls 8 to 11 engage in child
care activities, this gure increases to an average rate of 14.1% amongst teenage girls
(ages 12 to 17). For all boys ages 8 to 17, the average participation rate in child care is
constant, at approximately 4%.
These patterns in the allocation of time devoted to child care could be framed into
di¤erent types of household models, such as the "separate spheres" bargaining model
(Lundberg and Pollak 1993), or collective models (Chiappori 1988; Browning et al. 2010),
or even a standard unitary household model. Each specic set up would allow modeling
the possible e¤ects of Progresa on the intra-household allocation of time using interior or
corner solutions to account for the fact that child care is a female (wife/mother) activity.
The objective of this paper is not to determine which model ts the data better but
rather to estimate reduced form solutions (compatible with di¤erent theoretical set ups)
and identify the impacts of the intervention on time allocated to child care.
We focus on the allocation of time to child care by the mother and her rst 12 to 17
years old daughter because: (i) they are the two main caregivers in the household, (ii)
households with teenage girls enrolled in secondary school are eligible to receive the largest
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transfer amounts, and (iii) the transfer is given directly to the household female head,
who is likely to be the mother. All of these suggest that the impacts of the program on
child care provision are likely to be largest amongst mothers and their older daughters.8
We consider that the mother allocates her time between child care and leisure, and her
rst daughters time between child care, schooling, and leisure. She chooses the optimal
levels to maximize her utility function which is a function of total time to child care, her
and her daughters leisure, and her daughters schooling subject to a budget constraint,
and to her and her daughters time constraints. In this stylized household, the Progresa
intervention amounts to:
(i) an increase in the mothers non-labor income given the nutritional grant.
(ii) the provision of a minimum level of maternal care, through increased awareness,
knowledge and access, given the required attendance to the "pláticas", preventive
health visits and the nutritional supplements.
(iii) a reduction in the price of schooling given the educational grant that the 12 to 17
year old daughter receives conditional on attendance. This implies that time in
child care is more expensive relative to time in school for daughters in treatment
households.
The budget constraint in treatment households thus integrates the change in the price
of schooling and the unconditional nutritional grant. Assuming interior solutions, each
one of these intervention components result in:
(i) an ambiguous e¤ect on total maternal child care. If child care is assumed a normal
good, maternal child care provision increases with income controlled by the mother
8We assume that market child care services are unavailable in these disadvantaged rural communities.
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through an income e¤ect. However, because child care requires maternal time as
an input factor, increases in maternal income might increase her leisure, and hence
reduce her time devoted to child care.
(ii) direct increases in the total quantity of child care provided.
(iii.a) increases in the daughters time to school through the own-substitution e¤ect be-
cause of the reduction in the price of schooling.
(iii.b) reductions in the daughters time allocated to child care through the own-substitution
e¤ect, assuming the daughters child care and schooling times are substitutes.
(iii.c) increases in maternal child care time through the cross-substitution e¤ect, given her
and her rst daughters time are substitute inputs in the production of child care.
In all treatment households, maternal time allocated to child care can be a¤ected by
the nutritional grant (income e¤ect) and by the compliance with the program requirements
(preventive health visits and attendance at "pláticas"). However, cross-substitution e¤ects
in child care time (e¤ect iii.c) would only arise amongst those mothers whose daughters
are eligible to receive the educational grant. In the empirical exercise, we will exploit
the exogenous variation introduced by the random assignment of households (or rather
communities) to treatment and control groups, and heterogeneity in mothers o¤spring
to disentangle the cross-substitution e¤ect from the composite of the other two e¤ects
(income e¤ect and compliance with program requirements). This composite e¤ect will be
a residual in our empirical specication and its components unidentiable.
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4 Estimation and Identication
The central question explored in this paper is to identify empirically whether there have
been changes in time allocated to child care in the household as a result of the intervention
and understand the underlying mechanisms at play. In this section, we present some
preliminary evidence, lay out the empirical specication and discuss identication.
4.1 Preliminary Evidence and Empirical Specication
We start by comparing the means of the dependent variables of interest in the treatment
and control groups in May 1999.9 Results in Table II show that, conditioning on having
a teenager aged 12 to 17, mothers in the treatment group have higher participation rates
in child care than mothers in the control group although the di¤erence, of 4.9 percentage
points, is not statistically signicant. For rst daughters aged 12 to 17, there is a 6.9 points
signicant reduction in child care participation and a 7.9 points signicant increase in
school participation given treatment. The comparison of raw means shows no signicant
di¤erences in the amount of time devoted to any of the activities considered, conditional
on participation.
We next estimate the e¤ect of Progresa on hours to child care provided by mothers
and their rst teenage daughters, controlling for maternal, household and community
characteristics.10 Table III presents OLS and Tobit (left-censoring at zero) estimates.
9We cannot test the exogeneity of treatment by comparing baseline time allocation patterns between
treatments and controls due to lack of data. Randomization should however guarantee that they were
not statistically di¤erent.
10We include these covariates in the regression to reduce residual variance with respect to the simple
comparison of raw means shown in Table II. They are: maternal age, age squared, years of education,
ethnicity, head of the household status and whether she is a paid worker; rst daughters education
(in years); baseline and contemporary household demographic composition; baseline assets (dirt oor,
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Some would argue that OLS is preferable to Tobit on the basis that the zeros in time use
data represent infrequencies rather than censoring of observations, given the short period
of reference of the data collected (Stewart 2009). As shown in the last row of Table III,
49% of the mothers in control households and 79% of their rst 12 to 17 year old daughters
report zero time to child care over the day before the interview. As such, we consider the
infrequency argument to hold only partially and present results on both OLS and Tobit
for comparison purposes. Indeed, there are no dramatic di¤erences (in terms of signs of
e¤ects) between both approaches although Tobit o¤ers more precise estimates. Results
show that maternal time to child care has increased, even if not signicantly (columns
1 and 2), while that provided by the rst daughter has decreased (last two columns).
The latter e¤ect is signicant in Tobit specications. As shown in columns 3 to 6, the
coe¢ cient on the interaction of the treatment dummy with having children ages 12 to 17
is positive and signicant (Tobit model), suggesting that mothers substitute their older
children in the provision of child care given treatment. The negative coe¢ cient on the
presence of teenage o¤spring in the household further supports this hypothesis.
These ndings, consistent with the descriptive statistics on means reported in Table
II, are not very signicant statistically. Note, however, that these results correspond to
average program e¤ects across various treatments. As explained in Section 2, eligible
households in treated villages can receive di¤erent amounts of transfers depending on
family structure and, to a smaller extent, on when they took up the program (variation
occurs amongst treated villages because of administrative i.e. random delays). Thus,
we next estimate the e¤ects of the program controlling for the heterogenous cash transfers
electricity and farm size); and community characteristics (male agricultural wage in the community,
distance to large urban center, distance to secondary school, presence of pre-school and presence of junior
high school imparted via TV, or "telesecundaria"in the community).
15
potentially received by a household since the rst transfer payment received. This amounts
to estimating the "intention to treat" e¤ect but allowing for heterogeneity in treatment.
Denoting vi the total transfer amount the household has potentially received since
taking up the program, we estimate the treatment e¤ects on child care provision using:
~yi = 0vi + 1Ti +
PR
r=1 rxri + "i (1)
where ~yi is the number of hours individual i allocates to child care, Ti is a binary variable
equal to 1 if i lives in an original treatment community and 0 otherwise; vi is the total
transfer amount the household has potentially received since taking up the program; and
the fxrigr=1;::;R are R individual, household and community characteristics listed above.
While all poor households in treated villages are eligible for benets (Ti = 1), the
program rules are such that the cash benets they are eligible to get di¤er notably ac-
cording to the education levels of children, and because of delays in program take-up
across treatment villages. Thus, the total average e¤ect of the program on i is the aver-
age of 0vi + 1Ti. Note that interaction terms between vi and Ti are implicitly included
since, by construction, viTi = vi. This implies that any omitted interaction terms cannot
appear in the error term "i.
In a second specication, we interact the household treatment status with dummies
controlling for the mothers o¤spring composition to capture heterogeneous responses
across mothers living in di¤erent household environments:
~yi = 0vi + 1Ti + 2S
j
i + 3TiS
j
i +
PR
r=1 rxri + "i (2)
where Sji equals 1 if the situation j is true. We consider two possible situations: (i)
mother i has daughters or sons aged 12 to 17, and (ii) mother i has daughters aged 12 to
17. As noted in Section 3, cross-substitution e¤ects in maternal time allocated to child
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care only arise amongst those mothers who live in treatment households (Ti = 1) and have
school aged children eligible to receive the educational grant (Sji = 1). We argue that the
coe¢ cient on the interaction of treatment and o¤spring composition, 3, identies this
average cross-substitution e¤ect. Given the child care participation patterns shown in
Figure 1 i.e. females older than 12 are the main child care providers in the household
we expect any cross-substitution e¤ect to take place between mothers and their 12 to 17
year old daughters.
In this specication, the coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy, 1, is the remaining
e¤ect of the program on the mothers time to child care. It combines the e¤ects of the
nutritional grant (income e¤ect) and of the compliance with the program requirements
(preventive health visits and attendance to the "pláticas") that a¤ect all mothers in
treated households regardless of their o¤spring composition.11
In the event of cross-substitution e¤ects between mothers and rst daughters, we
should also expect reductions in the amount of time the oldest daughter spends taking care
of her younger siblings. To test this, we estimate equation (1) on child care participation
of the rst daughters aged 12 to 17 of the mothers in the sample.12 We additionally
estimate equation (1) on their school participation and leisure time so as to obtain a
broader picture of their time allocation. Similarly, we also estimate equations (1) and (2)
on maternal leisure.
11These e¤ects could be confounded with other factors such as maternal education also correlated
with household composition. However, the random allocation of benets and the fact that the subsample
of treatment and control mothers is balanced (see Table I) dismisses such concern.
12As shown in Table I, the number of daughters aged 12 to 17 is balanced between mothers in the
treatment and control groups. Over 70% of the mothers in the estimation sample have only one daughter
12 to 17 years old.
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4.2 Identication and Semiparametric Estimation
If ~yi is observed, equations (1) and (2) can be estimated by OLS and o¤er consistent
estimates of all parameters, provided that all right hand side variables are exogenous.
Exogeneity of the treatment variable Ti is granted by the randomization; exogeneity of
demographic characteristics Si can be assumed. OLS is still consistent if "i includes
some classical measurement error on the dependent variable namely, an additive error
independent of all explanatory variables. However, estimating (1) and (2) by OLS using
hours of care as observed in the survey as dependent variables, we obtain insignicant
parameters 0 and 1 (results not shown). Such imprecision is indicative of potential
important measurement errors, which are common in time use data.
Indeed, the empirical distribution of the dependent variables of interest, time to child
care, hinges to possible non-classical measurement error, such as that resulting from
rounding time to an integer number of hours. As shown in Figure 2, the distribution
of time (in hours) to child care provided by the mother and her rst teenage daughter
present a discrete support on specic values, mainly hours and half hours. In such cases,
a measurement error !i, possibly correlated with explanatory variables, may a¤ect the
observed outcome: yi = ~yi + !i. This generates an endogeneity bias in the estimation
of (1) or (2) by OLS since !i will be correlated with some explanatory variables. The
non-independent error !i is very problematic in this type of data. While it is not possible
to test whether such non- classical measurement error !i exists, the empirical distribution
of yi, plotted in Figure 2, with mass points, bunching and multiple modes suggests so.
For this reason and in order to get rid of non-classical measurement error, we choose to
discretize the observed outcomes even if at the cost of "losing" some information. This
amounts to dening an observed binary outcome: yi = If~yi>0g. Assuming that measure-
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ment errors !i on the "continuous" variable ~yi are such that they do not change this
discrete outcome i.e. assuming that the non-classical measurement error on the number
of hours does not set hours to zero when they are non zero and viceversa, or equivalently
If~yi>0g = Ifyi>0g this discretization is su¢ cient to identify coe¢ cients consistently. Then,
one can use the binary outcome model 1fyi>0g = I
0vi+1Ti+
PR
r=1
rxri+"i>0
 to identify
parameters. We also take a less restrictive approach which categorizes total hours into a
limited number of intervals dened sensitively to the underlying thresholds in the empir-
ical distribution of hours and guaranteeing enough power in each cell.
Parametric identication of (1) and (2) is possible using standard probit and ordered
probit models under the assumption that the error term of the latent variable follows a
normal distribution and the normalization of a parameter (0 = 1, for example). How-
ever, parametric identication relies too heavily on the chosen distribution of the error
term. In our setting, additional problems arise given that the error term is likely het-
eroscedastic for two reasons: (i) we are testing for heterogeneous treatment e¤ects across
households with di¤erent demographic compositions; and (ii) Progresa sampled a large
number of randomized communities (clusters), each consisting of relatively few poor cor-
related households. As such, maximum likelihood will only be valid as the number of
observations in the cluster tends to innity with the cluster unit xed.
We have tested and generally rejected normality using Conditional Moments and
other standard tests (results available upon request). Consequently, we estimate these
discrete choice models semiparametrically. Semiparametric estimation has the advantage
of not imposing any particular distribution (normal, logistic, etc.) on the latent variable
errors and allow them to su¤er from conditional heteroscedasticity of unknown form. We
opt for the method of Lewbel (2000) because of the suitability of our data for such purpose.
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Indeed, we can exploit the randomization of treatment in the data to justify the partial
independence assumption (Assumption A.2 below), which is at the core of the method.
Let us denote y, v and " the column vectors of yi and vi and "i, respectively. X =
(T; x1; ::; xr) is the matrix of right hand side variables including T , but without v also
called the "special regressor"; and we denote  = [1; 1; :::; R]. Normalizing 0 = 1,
Lewbel (2000) considers the binary choice model,
y = Ifv+X+">0g (3)
and the following assumptions:
A.1: Continuity: the conditional distribution v given X is continuous.
A.2: Partial Independence: the conditional distribution of " is independent of v given X,
F"("jv;X) = F"("jX).
A.3: Large Support: the conditional distribution of v given X has support [vL, vH ] that
contains zero: vL  0  vH . The support of  X 0   " is a subset of [vL, vH ].
A.4: Uncorrelated errors: E("X) = 0, as in linear models.
Under assumptions A.1 to A.4, Lewbel (2000) shows that  can be estimated (with
root N consistency) by an OLS regression of y on X, where
y =
y   Ifv>0g
f(vjX) (4)
and f(vjX) denotes the conditional probability density function of v givenX. If the distri-
bution of v is unknown, a nonparametric rst stage is needed to estimate it. Alternatively,
an ordered data estimator can be used under more stringent conditions. For simplicity
and precision in the estimation, we will assume that f(vjX) is normally distributed as in
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Lewbel (2006). Lewbel (2000) shows that the proposed methodology extends to ordered
response models with K choices dened as:
y =
K 1P
k=0
kIfk<v+X+"k+1g (5)
where 0 =  1 and K = +1. In this case, the transformation of the dependent
variable is written as:13
y =
y
K 1   Ifv>0g
f(vjX) (6)
In our application, the chosen "special regressor" vi is the potential transfer amount
that the household should have accumulated at the time of analysis (May 1999) since it
rst received benets. This potential transfer vi is determined by the treatment rules in
case of compliance. It depends on the household composition and childrens school en-
rollment in 1997 (baseline). It corresponds to the value of cash transfers the household
can have obtained since take up assuming it complies with the program rules like school
attendance. As discussed, vi and Ti di¤er since di¤erent treatment households are eligi-
ble for di¤erent transfer amounts depending on the gender and age of their school-aged
children and on whether they are enrolled in school. Since vi is predicted projecting
forward baseline household composition and school enrolment, the required assumption
for identication is that pre-program household composition and school enrolment are
exogenous to program allocation. This is guaranteed by the randomization and validated
by Behrman and Todd (1999) for the evaluation sample, and in Table I for our subsample
13Lewbel (2000) also proposes an extension to censored data which consists in applying the ordered
data estimator repeatedly. More precisely, it involves: (i) dening a continuum of values for k (thresh-
olds), (ii) obtaining a ^k for each threshold dened, and (iii) e¢ ciently combining the ^ks. Estimating as
many ^
0
ks as values takes the dependent variable is an unnecessary computational burden. For simplicity
and given the empirical distribution of the dependent variable, we chose to categorize total hours into a
limited number of intervals, as discussed earlier.
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of analysis.
We next discuss why the proposed vi satises the assumptions required for identica-
tion. First, the amount of accumulated potential transfers is a continuous variable (A.1)
and includes zero in the support (A.3): it is positive for treatment households and zero
for control households.
Concerning (A.2), and as dened above, vi = T i f
(Di97) where f (:) is known and
determined by the program design as a function of a subset of baseline observables Di97 
Xi97, and where ti represents the length of time the household has been receiving benets
for in May 1999. We can rewrite vi as vi = Tif(Di)ui where Ti is the randomized treatment
status and f(:) is a known function of a subset of May 1999 observables Di (household
demographics, school attendance and grade attended) and Di  (x1i; ::; xri). Thus, by
construction, ui =
ti f
(Di97)
Tif(Di)
is an exogenous variable varying according to two random
elements: (i) the administrative di¢ culties that delayed the reception of benets amongst
beneciaries; and (ii) any departure in household demographics and childrens school
attendance in May 1999 from the situation predicted using baseline information. Note
that ui 6= 0 implies that vi is a nondeterministic function of other regressors in x1i; ::; xri,
as is required for identication.
The large support condition (A.3) requires that, given X, the support of  X 0   "
is a subset of [vL, vH ] for all X. In our particular case, (A.3) is likely to be satised
everywhere except when the treatment variable (which is amongst X) is equal to zero. In
this case, v is equal to zero and thus the support of v is [vL, vH ]=f0g and cannot include
the support of  X 0   ". However, we are in a particular case in which identication is
restored because the large support assumption is valid on the "treated only" (T = 1) and
we can assume that the distribution of " is independent of T given all other Xs.
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Magnac and Maurin (2007) show that when the large support assumption is not valid
for someX, the parameters  are only set-identied. This means that there are several vec-
tors  and conditional distributions F"("jv; T;X) that can be observationally equivalent.
In our case, since the large support assumption is valid when treatment is one (T = 1), the
identied set of coe¢ cients  that is coherent with the probability P (yi = 1jvi; Ti = 1; X)
is a singleton (in some sense  can be identied from the treated only). Because of the
randomization, we can assume that " is independent of T and v given x1; ::; xr, then
F"("jv; T; x1; ::; xr) = F"("jx1; ::; xr) which means that the distribution function of " is
independent of whether the household is being treated or not. Then, the method allows
to nonparametrically identify the distribution of " on the treated (T = 1) and thus all
parameters.
Assumptions (A.1) to (A.4) imply that the conditional probability of success, pr(y =
1jv;X), increases monotonically and varies from 0 to 1 over the support [vL; vH ] of v. As
this is admittedly very restrictive in empirical applications, Magnac and Maurin (2007)
propose an alternative assumption to (A.3): a symmetry condition on the tails of the
errors ". Let yvL = X
0 + vL + " be the propensity of success for individuals with the
smallest v, vL; and yvH =  (X 0 + vH + ") the propensity of failure for individuals with
the largest v, vH . Then, the symmetry condition can be expressed as:
A.5: E(X 0yvLIfyvL>0g) = E(X
0yvHIfyvH>0g)
A.5 requires that the propensity of success yvL(or pr(y = 1jvL; X)) and the propensity
of failure yvH (or pr(y = 0jvH ; X)) are identically distributed. If so, the Lewbel (2000)
estimator is unbiased. If symmetry of the tails is not satised, it is always possible to
choose conditional distributions for yvL and yvH by trimming outliers in the distribution
of v in such a way that symmetry is more likely satised (Magnac and Maurin 2007).
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Moreover, Khan and Tamer (2010) have shown that the rate of convergence of the
Lewbel (2000) estimator can be slower than the parametric one and that numerical insta-
bility can happen depending on tail distributions. We have thus devoted some particular
attention to the support condition and have tested the stability and robustness of our
estimator to trimming parameters (results available upon request).
Finally, note that in this setting, monotonicity of the conditional probability of success
pr(y = 1jv;X) over the support of v amounts to assuming that: (i) the mothers child care
time and the rst daughters schooling time are nondecreasing functions of the cumulative
potential transfers vi; and (ii) the rst daughters child care time is a nonincreasing
function of vi. We have discussed the theoretical validity of these assumptions in Section
3 and have "tested" its empirical validity (results available upon request).
5 Results and Discussion
We estimate the e¤ect of Progresa on participation in child care, and on the extent of
participation in child care and leisure for mothers of children under 3 (Tables IV and V)
and for the older daughter ages 12 to 17 of these mothers. We dene leisure as 24 hours
minus total time devoted to other (work and non-work) activities. It includes time spent
sleeping, eating and socializing. For the rst daughter, we also estimate the program
impact on participation and on the extent of participation in school (Tables VI and VII).
In each table we rst report OLS estimates (Models A), then probit or ordered probit
estimates depending on the nature of the dependent variable (Models B), and nally the
semiparametric (Lewbel) estimates (Models C).
All regressions include the explanatory variables listed in Section 4 but estimates are
robust to the exclusion of covariates. We also trim extremely low values of the conditional
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probability density function of vi as they imply, by construction, outlier observations of
the transformed dependent variable y.
5.1 Maternal Time
Table IV presents estimates of the impact of the program on maternal participation in
child care (binary outcome) and Table V on their extent of participation (ordered discrete
outcome). The latter variable takes six di¤erent values: k 2 f0; 1; :::; 5g = fno time
devoted to child care, up to one hour, between one and two hours, two and four hours,
four to seven, seven to thirteeng.14
Estimation results follow very similar patterns for both types of outcomes. Models 1A
to 1C in Table IV show no signicant e¤ect of treatment on maternal participation in child
care when all mothers are pooled together neither parametrically nor semiparametrically.
However, when treatment is interacted with whether the mother has o¤spring aged 12
to 17 (Models 2A to 2C), the e¤ect becomes positive and signicant. Moreover, the
coe¢ cient on having 12 to 17 year old children alone is negative and signicant. We
interpret these ndings as indicative of: (i) a cross-substitution e¤ect between mothers
and their older children in child care provision; and (ii) Progresa attenuates the cross-
substitution e¤ect. The semiparametric mean marginal e¤ect of Progresa on child care
participation for mothers with children younger than 3 and 12 to 17 teenagers is 7.15
percentage points (point estimate of 0.44 as shown in Model 2C).15 This results in a 13.9
14Results are robust to a redenition of these categories.
15For dichotomous outcomes, we compute the marginal e¤ects on the estimated coe¢ cients as: Mij =
4[1 G^( vi xi^)]
4xj =
4[1 G^(zi^)]
4xj = G^(z^
0
i )   G^(z^1i ), where Mij is the e¤ect of switching the jth binary
variable, xj , from 0 to 1 on the probability that yi equals 1; and z^1i is the value of the index  vi   xi^
when the j-th binary variable is set to 1, and similarly for z^0i when the value of j is set to 0. G^(:) is
the estimated cumulative distribution function of the probability of yi given zi. We nonparametrically
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percentage increase in child care participation, given an initial participation rate of 51.4%
amongst these women. We further interact treatment with a dummy equal to 1 if the
mother has a daughter as opposed to a child aged 12 to 17 and nd that the coe¢ cient
on this interaction is also positive and signicant (Model 3C in Table IV).
Panel I in Table V reports similar e¤ects on the extent of participation in child care.
Mothers of children (daughters) 12 to 17 are more likely to increase the amount of time
they spend taking care of their younger children given treatment (Model 2C (3C) in Panel
I). Consistently, the analysis on the extent of maternal leisure in Panel II shows that these
women enjoy less leisure given treatment. This reduction in their leisure time is partly
explained by increases in time to child care, to other domestic activities and to compliance
with the program requirements.
The qualitative evidence in Adato et al. (2000) endorses these ndings. During
the summer of 1999, the authors conducted focus groups with 230 beneciary and non-
beneciary women to learn about their perceptions on the program. The authors report:
"Another reason that womens time burden increases is because of the need to do work that
was previously done by children who are now attending school, particularly secundaria.
However, their mothers see this as worthwhile in order for their children to study. (...)
Although some women said that the father also does some of this work, more often it was
the mother." (Adato et al. 2000, p. xiii).
5.2 First Daughters Time
Next, we turn our attention to the allocation of time by rst daughters. Panels I in Tables
VI and VII present the estimated program impact on their participation and extent of
estimate G^(:) running the kernel regression of yi on zi. Results reported are computed using a Gaussian
Kernel and 500 equally spaced points in the range of zi and are robust to larger numbers of points.
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participation to child care. The latter variable takes four di¤erent values: k 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g =
fno time devoted to child care, up to one hour, between one and two hours, more than
two hoursg.
The semiparametric estimates in Table VI evidence a reduction of 6.3 percentage
points in the rst daughters probability of engaging in child care activities, or a 35.8%
decrease in participation (estimated coe¢ cient of -0.031, Model C in Panel I). Signicant
reductions are also observed in their extent of participation (Model C in Panel I, Table
VII). A plausible concern is that these reductions are in fact driven by an increase in
school attendance of other siblings in primary school age. While this hypothesis is not
testable given that almost all teenage girls with siblings younger than 3 also have siblings
in primary school age (6 to 11), it is well-known that the program had little e¤ect on
primary school enrolment (Schultz 2004).
About 69% of girls in the sample living in households with children younger than 3
that engage in child care activities do not attend school: of these, 3% report that they
are not in school because they have to help in the house.16 Moreover, conditional on
enrollment, another 4% report having to take care of their siblings as one of the reasons
why they miss school. Other more frequent reasons are teacher absenteeism, illness and
care of the sick.
These gures are somewhat indicative that child care and schooling are substitute
activities for teenage girls. Not surprisingly, we nd a signicant increase in school par-
ticipation (attendance and doing homework) for rst daughters aged 12 to 17 (Model C in
Panel II, Table VI). The estimated coe¢ cient of 0.07 translates into a marginal e¤ect of
4.1 percentage points, or a 9.8% increase in schooling. This is consistent with the positive
16Other, more common, reasons why they are not in school are the lack of money (47%), that they do
not like it (16%), or that the school is too far (8%).
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program impact on female secondary school enrolment reported in Schultz (2004) and
Parker and Skouas (2000). Lewbel estimates in Panels II and III in Table VII show that
while the increase in the extent of time allocated to schooling activities by rst daughters
aged 12 to 17 is not signicant, the reduction in the extent of leisure time is. This might
suggest that these girls reduce (or stop) their contribution to child care in the household
to take up school full time, as a result of the reduction in the price of schooling. Alter-
natively or in addition, the intervention may be a¤ecting the allocation of teenage girls
time to other activities and in particular, to other household chores as documented in
Rubio-Codina (2010).17
5.3 Quantity and Quality of Care
We start this subsection by investigating whether mothers (and possibly other household
members) just or more than substitute for their daughterschild care provision. To this
end, we estimate equation (2) on total hours devoted to child care at the household level.
We dene total household hours to child care as the sum of hours spent in child care
by each household member and categorize the variable as k = f0; 1; :::; 6g = fno time
allocated to child care, up to one hour, one to two hours, two to three hours, three to ve,
ve to seven, more than seveng.
If mothers and their 12 to 17 year old daughters are the only two household members
taking care of the very young in the household and if mothers fully substitute for the
time to child care previously provided by their older daughters, then we should expect
no e¤ect on total household hours. On the other hand, if mothers (and possibly other
17As a robustness check, we re-estimate all previous regressions on the restricted sample of mums and
older daughters whose time information refers to weekdays. The estimated coe¢ cients (available upon
request) are very similar albeit less precisely estimated to the ones reported here.
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household members) increase the amount of time they devote to child care by more than
the amount previously devoted by teenage girls, then 3 in equation (2) should be positive
and signicant. A negative and signicant 3 would imply the opposite e¤ect and as a
consequence, a reduction in total household hours to child care in treatment households.
Estimates in Table VIII show a signicant increase in the extent of total household
hours to child care in treatment households with children under 3 and teenagers aged 12
to 17. This implies that Progresa fosters net increases in total child care provided within
the household.
The next natural question is whether mothers alone are more than compensating for
care time previously provided by their older daughter or whether other household members
are also contributing. Table IX shows results from estimating equation (2) using the share
of child care hours provided by household member m over total household hours as the
dependent variable. We consider the following groups of household members: the mothers
of 0 to 3 years old; other adult women; adult men; brothers aged 8 to 11 and 12 to 17;
and sisters aged 8 to 11 and 12 to 17 of under 3 year old children.
Results are consistent with the premise that the mother is the household member
providing a larger share of child care in substitution of the older daughter and overall.
The coe¢ cient on treatment interacted with girls (daughters) 12 to 17 on the share of
mothers time is positive and almost signicant at the 10%. The coe¢ cient on treatment
for the share of time devoted to child care for daughters aged 12 to 17 continues to be
negative and signicant. Surprisingly, daughters aged 8 to 11 who are the sisters of the
12 to 17 year old daughter also seem to increase their share of child care provision in
treatment households. Because of the low participation rates for this group (around 3%)
we are inclined to think that this e¤ect is driven by a few outliers.
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Hence, and as long as we believe that the mother is more productive in the provision
of child care, these ndings are suggestive that the program involves gains not only in
the quantity but also in the quality of the care given to the very young. The biology
and psychology literature have repeatedly acknowledged the mother as the best child
nurturer. Frequent breast-feeding and mother warmth are widely recognized as key care
practices (UNICEF 2001). Variations in the quality of maternal care are also proven to
produce lasting changes in stress reactivity, anxiety, and memory function in the o¤spring
(Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007). The works of Case and Paxson (2001) and Case et
al. (2001) are examples in the economic literature of the important role the biological
mother as opposed to the stepmother plays in the adequate investment in the childs
health and education. Moreover, beneciary mothers increase their knowledge on parent-
ing both through the interaction with medical sta¤ at the health centers and by attending
the "pláticas".
On the other hand, one could argue that environmental factors (the education of the
caregiver, for example) matter more than biological attachment. In the current context,
this would imply that older daughters are better caregivers as they are, on average, more
educated than their mothers. However, when we interact the treatment dummy with years
of education of the mother we nd stronger substitution e¤ects amongst more educated
mothers (results available upon request). This result conrms that the increase in quantity
of care is, on average, likely to go hand in hand with increases in quality.18
18We are using more recent rounds of the Progresa evaluation data to investigate whether increases in
maternal time to child care do improve child cognitive and non-cognitive development. Because we have
to rely on a di¤erent identication strategy, we consider this issue to be beyond the scope of this paper.
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6 Conclusion
This paper provides semiparametric estimates of the e¤ect of Progresa on child care pro-
vision. We have rst shown that child care is almost exclusively provided by females
in the rural communities where the program operates and have argued that the inter-
vention might lead to increases in the quantity of care provided within the household.
The nutritional supplements, health checkups and "pláticas" result in direct increases
in the quantity of child care mothers provide and young children receive. Moreover, the
conditional-on-attendance education grants result in a reallocation of time to "better pay-
ing" activities given the change in the relative shadow values of household memberstime
it entails. As a consequence, increases in maternal care in substitution for care previously
provided by her older daughter were expected. These increases can arguably result in
more and better care if the mother is assumed to be a better caregiver.
We have applied the Lewbel (2000) semiparametric method and provided evidence in
support of such mother-daughter substitution e¤ect in the provision of child care. While
mothers with 0 to 3 and 12 to 17 year old children are signicantly less likely to participate
in child care, this behavior is reversed given treatment. In addition, older daughters
devote their freed up time to schooling. We also observe an increase in total household
time given over to child care in these households. These ndings suggest that by linking
benets to school attendance the Progresa program fosters human capital accumulation
both through keeping teenage girls in school and through more and "better" child care.
Increased maternal care is likely to lead to better development in the early ages and
increased school readiness. Note that it would have been unfeasible to increase the levels
of child care provided by directly conditioning the reception of benets to maternal time
allocated to child care, as it is not possible to monitor how much time mothers spend
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with their children.
Interestingly, we have not found signicant program impacts on child care provision
amongst mothers of children younger than 12 nor on the pooled sample of mothers. This
suggests two things: rst, the program mainly alters the household allocation of time
devoted to child care through the reduction in the price of schooling (educational grant).
Second, the educational talks and preventive care do not inuence maternal child care
provision as much as desired. Gertler and Fernald (2004) point at the inadequate devel-
opment of the "pláticas" as an explanation of the inexistent program impacts on cognitive
development. An alternative explanation could be that mothers in control communities
also attend these talks, which would confound the estimated treatment e¤ect. However, it
seems unlikely that households in control communities know about them, let alone travel
to treatment communities to attend. In any event, and given the important role of ECD
in long run individual and societal welfare, CCT programs could re-consider introduc-
ing more intense parental and community training activities oriented to promote child
stimulation and early education.
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Figure 1: Child Care Participation Rates by Sex and Age  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Hours to Child Care by Mothers and First Daughters  
                 (Ages 12 to 17)  
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Table I: Balance between Treatment and Control Groups
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
I.  Current Maternal Characteristics  (May 1999)
Age 2571 29.66 6.418 1465 29.57 6.451 0.412
Years of Education 2534 3.55 2.720 1447 3.51 2.781 0.224
Household Head =1 2537 1.89 0.136 1447 1.94 0.138 -0.094
Indigenous =1 2534 40.84 0.492 1445 43.04 0.495 -0.374
Working for a Wage =1 2534 8.72 0.282 1446 5.95 0.237 1.601
Number of Children 0 to 3 2571 1.25 0.465 1465 1.25 0.476 -0.382
Number of Children 4 to 7 2571 1.05 0.798 1465 1.05 0.814 0.266
Number of Sons 8 to 11 2571 0.42 0.624 1465 0.38 0.605 1.500
Number of Sons 12 to 17 2571 0.37 0.697 1465 0.32 0.615 2.390*
Number of Daughters 8 to 11 2571 0.40 0.604 1465 0.40 0.614 -0.233
Number of Daughters 12 to 17 2571 0.33 0.644 1465 0.32 0.631 0.588
Years of Education First 12 to 17 Year Old Daughter 2571 1.38 2.589 1465 1.29 2.512 0.918
II.  Baseline Household Characteristics  (October1997)
Number of Children 0 to 3 2571 1.38 0.732 1465 1.41 0.740 -1.116
Number of Children 4 to 7 2571 1.09 0.851 1465 1.07 0.847 0.571
Number of Teenagers 8 to 17 2571 0.75 1.046 1465 0.72 1.002 0.837
Number of Adults 18 to 54 2571 2.26 0.779 1465 2.26 0.827 -0.284
Number of Adults Over 55 2571 0.14 0.415 1465 0.13 0.381 0.657
Electricity  =1 2568 61.06 0.488 1464 62.09 0.485 -0.219
Dirtfloor =1 2563 71.91 0.450 1460 76.23 0.426 -1.503
Animal and Land (more than 3 ha) Ownership =1 2561 29.48 0.456 1463 31.99 0.467 -0.854
III. Baseline Community Characteristics  (October1997)
Pre-school =1 2514 91.45 0.280 1417 91.11 0.285 0.123
Junior Secondary Education Imparted via TV =1 2571 21.78 0.413 1465 25.26 0.435 -0.608
Health Center =1 2571 76.66 0.423 1465 82.87 0.377 -1.568
Distance to Closest Secondary School (Km) 2571 2.45 2.171 1465 2.67 2.782 -0.562
Minimum Distance to Large Urban Centre (Km) 2571 105.46 44.046 1465 101.52 47.534 0.716
Monthly Community Agricultural Male Wage (pesos) 2506 6.27 0.313 1395 6.29 0.304 -0.572
Treatment Group Control Group
Notes: *Significant at 5%. Sample of mothers 18 to 44 with kids under 3 years old living in households, originally classified as poor, with no elder older than 65 not
working and no sick individuals.
Table II: Comparison of Raw Means of Dependent Variables
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
Dependent Variables 
Participation in Child Care (All Mothers ) =1 2571 50.80 0.500 1465 50.99 0.500 -0.075
Participation in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenagers) =1 973 47.28 0.500 536 42.35 0.495 1.421
Participation in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenage Girls) =1 636 49.37 0.500 343 44.90 0.498 1.107
Participation in Child Care (First Daughter) =1 626 14.22 0.350 337 21.07 0.408 -2.127*
Participation in School (First Daughter) =1 626 45.69 0.499 336 37.80 0.486 1.826+
Hours in Child Care (All Mothers)† 1306 3.76 2.862 747 3.74 2.854 0.088
Hours in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenagers)† 460 3.41 2.681 227 3.36 2.681 0.202
Hours in Child Care (Mothers of 12 to 17 Teenage Girls)† 314 3.32 2.703 154 3.39 2.631 -0.247
Hours in Child Care (First Daughter)† 89 2.31 2.247 71 2.06 1.497 0.846
Hours in School (First Daughter)† 286 6.15 1.586 127 6.00 1.471 0.969
Total Household (Hh) Hours in Child Care (All Hhs)† 1353 4.04 3.086 783 4.03 3.028 0.047
Total Hh Hours in Child Care (Hhs with 12 to 17 Teenagers)† 500 4.05 3.276 248 4.16 3.183 -0.420
Total Hh Hours in Child Care (Hhs with 12 to 17 Teenage Girls)† 345 4.03 3.435 170 4.38 3.241 -1.082
Treatment Group Control Group
Notes: +Significant at 10%; *Significant at 5%. Sample of mothers 18 to 44 with kids under 3 years old living in households, originally classified as poor, with no
elder older than 65 not working and no sick individuals. 
†Conditional on being positive.
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Table III: Parametric Evidence on Maternal and First Daughters (Ages 12 to 17) Time to Child Care  
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Treatment =1 0.043 0.102 -0.054 -0.151 0.010 -0.009 -0.095 -0.838*
(0.126) (0.243) (0.149) (0.265) (0.140) (0.258) (0.075) (0.408)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.246 -0.865*
(0.200) (0.423)
Treatment * Children 12 to 17 =1 0.263 0.713*
(0.177) (0.353)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.074 -0.332
(0.320) (0.643)
Treatment * Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.142 0.483
(0.190) (0.389)
Observations 4036 4036 4036 4036 4036 4036 971 971
Mean Dependent Variable (Controls) 1.909 1.909 1.909 1.909 1.909 1.909 0.365 0.365
Proportion Zeros (Controls) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.79 0.79
Mother First Daughter
Notes: *significant at 5%. SE clustered at the community level in parentheses. All regressions include the following covariates: maternal age, age squared,
years of education, ethnicity, head of the household status and whether she is a paid worker; the first daughter's year of education; baseline and
contemporary household demographic composition; baseline household assets (dirt floor, electricity and farm size); male agricultural wage in the
community at baseline, distance to large urban center, distance to secondary school, presence of pre-school and presence of junior high school imparted
via TV ("telesecundaria") in the community.
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Table IV: Maternal Participation in Child Care
Model 1A Model 2A Model 3A
    OLS PROBIT
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect LEWBEL
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect OLS PROBIT
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect LEWBEL
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect OLS PROBIT
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect LEWBEL
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect
Child Care Participation  =1 (Mean = 0.51)
Special Regressor (v) 0.345 5.843 2.247 - -5.314 -8.472 -3.248 - -2.533 -1.879 -0.722 -
(8.853) (22.617) (8.696) - (9.951) (25.386) (9.731) - (9.190) (23.580) (9.057) -
Treatment =1 0.014 0.020 0.008 0.007 0.004 -0.006 -0.033 -0.013 -0.054 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.001
(0.030) (0.077) (0.030) (0.005) (0.030) (0.078) (0.030) (0.053) (0.030) (0.077) (0.030) (0.008)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.166** -0.428** -0.163** -0.600* -0.001
(0.045) (0.120) (0.044) (0.276)
Treatment * Children 12 to 17 =1 0.095* 0.246* 0.093** 0.435** 0.071**
(0.037) (0.096) (0.036) (0.128)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.101 -0.259 -0.099 -0.097 0.010
 (0.071) (0.182) (0.069) (0.085)
Treatment * Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.062 0.164 0.063 0.257* 0.091*
(0.043) (0.109) (0.041) (0.111)
Notes: (N = 3710).*significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE clustered at the community level in parentheses. Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-5 have been trimmed. All regressions include the list of covariates in Table III.
Model 1B Model 1C Model 2B Model 2C Model 3B Model 3C
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Table V: Maternal Time to Child Care and Leisure 
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C
    OLS
ORDERED
PROBIT LEWBEL OLS
ORDERED
PROBIT LEWBEL OLS
ORDERED
PROBIT LEWBEL
I. Extent of Child Care Hours (Mean =1.94)
Special Regressor (v) 6.700 11.828 - -21.370 -6.995 - 1.093 6.041 -
(32.380) (22.201) - (36.543) (25.143) - (34.413) (23.769) -
Treatment =1 0.037 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.030 -0.059 0.030 -0.008 -0.007
(0.107) (0.071) (0.002) (0.107) (0.070) (0.052) (0.109) (0.071) (0.007)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.344* -0.287** -0.369*
(0.144) (0.105) (0.149)
Treatment * Children 12 to 17 =1 0.297* 0.217* 0.306**
(0.131) (0.090) (0.093)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.180 -0.145 -0.065
(0.232) (0.160) (0.056)
Treatment * Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.094 0.098 0.142*
(0.138) (0.096) (0.061)
II. Extent of Leisure (Mean = 7.54)
Special Regressor (v) 13.184 -2.596 - -21.415 -23.310 - 3.206 -7.842 -
(30.137) (19.251) - (35.890) (22.717) - (32.887) (20.842) -
Treatment =1 0.001 -0.035 -0.004 0.031 -0.016 0.056 0.014 -0.028 0.004
(0.104) (0.064) (0.003) (0.105) (0.064) (0.052) (0.105) (0.064) (0.007)
Children 12 to 17 =1 0.250+ 0.164+ 0.493*
(0.139) (0.086) (0.218)
Treatment * Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.316* -0.191* -0.457**
(0.126) (0.079) (0.118)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.059 0.041 0.100
(0.217) (0.135) (0.067)
Treatment * Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.162 -0.086 -0.233**
(0.141) (0.088) (0.078)
Notes: (N = 3710). +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE clustered at the community level in parentheses. Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-5 have been
trimmed. All regressions include the list of covariates in Table III.
Table VI: First Daughters (Ages 12 to 17) Participation in Child Care and Schooling
Model A
OLS PROBIT
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect LEWBEL
Mean 
Marginal 
Effect
I. Child Care Participation =1  (Mean =0.18)
Special Regressor (v) -6.691 -39.487 -9.300 - -
(11.966) (53.200) (12.530) - -
Treatment =1 -0.081 -0.367+ -0.088 -0.031** -0.063**
(0.051) (0.218) (0.061) (0.011) -
II. School Participation =1  (Mean =0.42)
Special Regressor (v) 36.248* 103.020* 36.748* - -
(17.587) (49.191) (17.548) - -
Treatment =1 -0.069 -0.193 -0.068 0.007* 0.041*
(0.075) (0.208) (0.072) (0.004) -
Notes: (N = 758) +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE clustered at the community level in parentheses.
Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-4 have been trimmed. All regressions include the list of covariates in Table III.
Model B Model C
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Table VII: First Daughters (Ages 12 to 17) Time to Child Care, Schooling and Leisure
Model A Model B Model C
OLS
ORDERED
PROBIT LEWBEL
I. Extent of Child Care Hours  (Mean =0.40)
Special Regressor (v) -4.755 -38.338 -
(26.676) (53.429) -
Treatment =1 -0.132 -0.356+ -0.032**
(0.112) (0.215) (0.011)
II. Extent of Hours in School  (Mean =2.51)
Special Regressor (v) 87.903+ 86.352* -
(46.025) (43.990) -
Treatment =1 -0.137 -0.146 0.002
(0.194) (0.188) (0.002)
III. Extent of Leisure  (Mean =9.04)
Special Regressor (v) 17.391 10.248 -
(62.764) (37.904) -
Treatment =1 -0.180 -0.116 -0.013*
(0.239) (0.143) (0.006)
Notes: (N = 758) +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE clustered at the community level in
parentheses. Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10-4 have been trimmed. All regressions include the
list of covariates in Table III.
Table VIII: Total Household Hours to Child Care
Model 2A Model 2B Model 2C Model 3A Model 3B Model 3C
OLS PROBIT LEWBEL OLS PROBIT LEWBEL
Special Regressor (v) -19.451 -3.856 - 13.278 11.820 -
(44.630) (24.416) - (41.990) (23.157) -
Treatment =1 -0.039 -0.056 -0.059 -0.004 -0.035 -0.007
(0.129) (0.069) (0.052) (0.130) (0.070) (0.007)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -0.290 -0.243* -0.342*
(0.189) (0.110) (0.138)
Treatment * Children 12 to 17 =1 0.340* 0.220* 0.299**
(0.165) (0.090) (0.091)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -0.084 -0.107 -0.061
(0.297) (0.161) (0.054)
Treatment * Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.041 0.080 0.148*
(0.177) (0.097) (0.062)
Notes: (N=3710). Mean Dep. Var. = 2.16 hours. *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE clustered at the community level in parentheses.
Observations in the top 7% of Fv and with f(v|x) > 1*10
-5
have been trimmed. All regressions include the list of covariates in Table III. Model
labels relate to those in Tables IV and V.
Extent of Child Care Hours
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Table IX: Share of Child Care Hours Provided by Different Household Members
Share
Mother
Share
Other 
Women
Share
Men
Share
Sons 
 8 to 11
Share
Sons 
 12 to 17
Share
Daughters 
8 to 11
Share
Daughters 
12 to 17
Treatment (T) =1 0.009 -0.013 -0.008 -0.007 0.005 -0.026 -0.031*
(0.024) (0.033) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)
Girls 12 to 17 in the Household =1 -0.072* -0.051 0.002 -0.011 0.006 -0.048**
(0.033) (0.046) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
T*Girls 12 to 17 in the Household =1 0.051 0.058 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.041*
(0.032) (0.045) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018)
Observations 4036 476 4100 1382 1047 1381 988
Mean Share Child Care Hours 0.44 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08
OLS
Notes: *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE clustered at the community level in parentheses. Share Household Member m  =Total Hours to Child Care of 
Household Member m  / Total Household Hours to Child Care. All regressions include the list of covariates in Table III.
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Figure A1: Monotonicity 
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Table AI: "Regression Analogue" Test for Normality (Pagan and Vella, 1989)
Model
Moment 
Restriction T-Stat
Joint Test:
Chi-Squared (2) 
Mother's Participation in Child Care Probit E(Pred2*GR) -1.18 
E(Pred3*GR) -1.70
Mother's Hours in Child Care Tobit E(Pred2*GR) -0.44
E(Pred3*GR) -2.20
Mothers' Leisure Hours Tobit E(Pred2*GR) -1.39
E(Pred3*GR) -1.31
First Daughter's Participation in Child Care Probit E(Pred2*GR) -0.54
E(Pred3*GR)  0.51
First Daughter's Hours in Child Care Tobit E(Pred2*GR) -0.04 
E(Pred3*GR) 0.01
First Daughter's Participation in School Probit E(Pred2*GR) -0.76
E(Pred3*GR) 0.54
First Daughter's Hours in School Tobit E(Pred2*GR) -1.82
E(Pred3*GR)  1.07
First Daughter's Leisure Hours Tobit E(Pred2*GR) -0.01
E(Pred3*GR) -0.03
3.33
(0.1893)
0.57
( 0.7530)
Notes: Pred are liniar predictions and GR are generalized residuals. 
4.56
(0.1025)
5.71
( 0.0575)
4.29
(0.1171)
0.29
(0.8651)
0.01
(0.9948)
0.58
(0.7501)
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All
All &
f(v|x) >1*10-5
98% Fv &
 f(v|x) > 1*10-5
95% Fv &
 f(v|x) >1*10-5
90% Fv &
 f(v|x) >1*10-5
Mod 2C - 1 Mod 2C - 2 Mod 2C - 3 Mod 2C - 4 Mod 2C - 5
Treatment =1 -0.100 -0.029 -0.049 -0.027 -0.005
(0.346) (0.050) (0.030) (0.028) (0.012)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -19.347 -0.430+ -0.475* -0.464* -0.392*
(17.068) (0.251) (0.202) (0.223) (0.187)
Treatment*Children 12 to 17 =1 4.141 0.361** 0.410** 0.381** 0.384**
(2.882) (0.138) (0.150) (0.139) (0.143)
Observations 4036 4031 3910 3789 3593
Mod 3C - 1 Mod 3C - 2 Mod 3C - 3 Mod 3C - 4 Mod 3C - 5
Treatment =1 -0.017 -0.002 -0.007 0.002 0.011
(0.196) (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.919 -0.131 -0.075 -0.111 -0.089
(3.471) (0.149) (0.089) (0.108) (0.118)
Treatment*Daughters 12 to 17 =1 3.633 0.272* 0.197* 0.281* 0.442*
(2.672) (0.129) (0.091) (0.138) (0.202)
Observations 4036 4033 3911 3790 3595
Mod 2C - 1 Mod 2C - 2 Mod 2C - 3 Mod 2C - 4 Mod 2C - 5
Treatment =1 -0.168 -0.057 -0.089* -0.046 -0.012
(0.167) (0.050) (0.040) (0.029) (0.010)
Children 12 to 17 =1 -7.471 -0.323 -0.318* -0.337* -0.283*
(6.783) (0.236) (0.136) (0.164) (0.117)
Treatment*Children 12 to 17 =1 1.647 0.300* 0.296** 0.301** 0.262**
(1.094) (0.122) (0.081) (0.097) (0.090)
Observations 4036 4031 3910 3789 3593
Mod 3C - 1 Mod 3C - 2 Mod 3C - 3 Mod 3C - 4 Mod 3C - 5
Treatment =1 -0.048 -0.027 -0.030* -0.007 0.000
(0.077) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 0.653 -0.125 -0.074 -0.090 -0.066
(1.253) (0.124) (0.076) (0.084) (0.065)
Treatment*Daughters 12 to 17 =1 1.349 0.192* 0.140* 0.159* 0.232*
(1.027) (0.097) (0.061) (0.077) (0.097)
Observations 4036 4033 3911 3790 3595
III. Extent of Leisure
Mod 2C - 1 Mod 2C - 2 Mod 2C - 3 Mod 2C - 4 Mod 2C - 5
Treatment =1 0.226 0.029 0.066* 0.032 0.008
(0.305) (0.037) (0.034) (0.023) (0.009)
Children 12 to 17 =1 15.467 0.360+ 0.473** 0.409* 0.328*
(14.142) (0.206) (0.172) (0.171) (0.130)
Treatment*Children 12 to 17 =1 -3.143 -0.333** -0.394** -0.416** -0.351**
(2.267) (0.114) (0.103) (0.111) (0.102)
Observations 4036 4031 3910 3789 3593
Mod 3C - 1 Mod 3C - 2 Mod 3C - 3 Mod 3C - 4 Mod 3C - 5
Treatment =1 0.087 0.022 0.021+ 0.004 -0.007
(0.152) (0.024) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -1.573 0.138 0.118 0.140 0.087
(2.579) (0.127) (0.095) (0.100) (0.087)
Treatment*Daughters 12 to 17 =1 -2.749 -0.246* -0.249* -0.281** -0.386**
(2.125) (0.105) (0.100) (0.107) (0.148)
Observations 4036 4033 3911 3790 3595
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. Outliers trimmed at different points of Fv and f(v|x) as indicated.
Fv is the empirical distribution of v, and f(v|x) denotes the conditional probability density function of v given x, as estimated from the data (predicted).
Models 2C and 3C labels relate to the labels in Table IV (Lewbel estimates). All regressions include the list of covariates in Table III.
I. Child Care Participation  =1
II. Extent of Child Care Hours
Table AII: Maternal Time to Child Care and Leisure. Sensitivity of Results to Trimming Outliers of Fv and f(v|x)
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All
All &
f(v|x) >1*10-4
98% Fv &
 f(v|x) > 1*10-4
95% Fv &
 f(v|x) >1*10-4
90% Fv &
 f(v|x) >1*10-4
Mod C - 1 Mod C - 2 Mod C - 3 Mod C - 4 Mod C - 5
Treatment =1 -0.028* -0.028* -0.026** -0.031** -0.030**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 963 963 872 807 704
Treatment =1 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.008+ 0.009*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 962 962 871 807 702
Treatment =1 -0.029** -0.029** -0.026** -0.031** -0.030**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Observations 963 963 872 807 704
Treatment =1 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 961 961 870 807 702
V. Extent of Leisure
Treatment =1 -0.010+ -0.010+ -0.009* -0.012* -0.013*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 973 973 880 815 710
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. Outliers trimmed at different points of Fv and
f(v|x) as indicated. Fv is the empirical distribution of v, and f(v|x) denotes the conditional probability density function of v given x, as
estimated from the data (predicted). Model C labels relate to the labels in Table V (Lewbel estimates). All regressions include the list of
covariates in Table III.
Table AIII: First Daughters (Ages 12 to 17) Time to Child Care, Schooling and Leisure. 
                    Sensitivity of Results to Trimming Outliers of Fv and f(v|x) 
I. Child Care Participation  =1
II. Extent of Child Care Hours
III. School Participation  =1
IV. Extent of Hours in School
